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I. INTRODUCTION 
Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates 
instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it 
practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression . . 
. . Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there 
needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; 
against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own 
ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them . . . .1 
 
There is an overwhelming sense of outrage and anger at perceived excesses in CEO 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
*
 Associate Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University. The standard 
disclaimers about errors and omissions apply.  
1
 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 8 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1926). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1118079
2 
Draft 
compensation ensuring regular coverage in the popular press, and making it, arguably, the most 
pressing question in current corporate law. There is scarcely a day when institutional 
shareholders, labor unions, politicians, and small investors are not calling for action to address 
this alleged menace. Inevitably, the heightened scrutiny and often shrill advocacy has contributed 
to the apparent disesteem for CEOs, with some polls showing that only seventeen percent of the 
public expect CEOs to tell the truth, in contrast with twenty-five percent for members of the U.S. 
Congress.2 This state of affairs has fuelled a vigorous debate about the desirability of regulatory 
intervention to address the problem, with no discernible agreement about the nature and extent of 
regulation.3 The populist nature of the cause has prompted politicians to enter the fray and recent 
years have seen activity in Congress4 and the SEC.5 Parallel to these developments, norms 
entrepreneurs have been active in creating social norms and enforcing them with social sanctions, 
with some modicum of success, suggesting that regulatory intervention might be premature until 
the ramifications of these actions are better understood.6  There is some evidence of apparent 
declines in executive compensation following the secondary enforcement of social norms.7 If 
existing social norms can be leveraged or new norms can be created, the behavioral change 
necessary for constraining CEO greed might be attained at a lower cost.8 This is salient in 
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 John Maggs, CEOs Under Fire, NAT’L J., June 16, 2007, at 42. Maggs notes that “[i]n the late 1990s, corporate 
execs were among the most revered people in America; people credited their entrepreneurship with helping to drive 
one of the most prosperous decades in U.S. history.” Id.  
3
 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 1-12 (2004); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 
1618-19 (2005); Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 
68 IND. L.J. 59, 67 (1992); John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005) (reviewing BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra). 
4
 See H.R. Res. 301, 110th Cong. (2007) (“providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 1257) to amend the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide shareholders with an advisory vote on executive compensation”). 
5
 In 2006 the SEC promulgated detailed rules aimed at providing better disclosure to shareholders. See, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8765.pdf 
6
 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 281-82 (1991). (“For a wide variety 
of reasons, legal intervention can flop. To avoid the frustration of trying to influence what is beyond their reach, legal 
instrumentalists would be wise to deepen their understanding of the nonlegal components of the system of social 
control.”) 
7
 Kaja Whitehouse, CEO Compensation Survey, Wall Street Journal, 4/9/2007, R4 (“a recent study shows greater rates of 
executive turnover at companies where boards were targeted by such (withhold) campaigns, and some firms – including 
Home Depot, Ryland Group and UnitedHealth Group – changed their pay practices after certain board members suffered 
sizable withhold votes last year.” See generally Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder 
Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021 (1999). 
8
 Abigail Barr, Social Dilemmas and Shame-Based Sanctions: Experimental Results from Rural Zimbabwe (Ctr. for the 
Study of Afr. Econs., Working Paper No. 149, 2001), available at http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2001-
11text.pdf.( : “Individuals who feel external shame respond to anticipated shame-based sanctions just as they respond to 
anticipated pecuniary sanctions; they choose a level of cooperation that equates the marginal expected loss in utility due 
to feeling external shame with the marginal loss in utility due to cooperating.”) 
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corporate law since the experience with legal sanctions has not been particularly satisfactory.9 
The law might also interact with social norms in salutary ways, a perception that might explain 
the efforts by norms entrepreneurs and other actors to seek legislative intervention.10  
Despite the high costs imposed by regulatory interventions, corporate law scholarship has 
only taken a nodding interest in alternative approaches that leverage the power of social norms. 11 
This is in marked contrast to areas like criminal law which have profited from scholarly 
exchanges about the role of social sanctions.12 The lack of scholarly attention is especially 
galling, because social sanctions have been employed by norms entrepreneurs like labor unions 
and institutional shareholders for several years.13 Norms entrepreneurs have frequently employed 
social sanctions like shaming prior to seeking more material sanctions like the expulsion of 
directors from corporate boards.14 Their ability to deploy social sanctions is enhanced by the 
alignment of objectives amongst shareholders,15 and the significant gatekeeping role of epistemic 
communities.16 In addition, corporate directors are relatively homogenous, and belong to several 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
9
 Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 
92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 126 (2006). 
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 See Testimony of Richard Ferlauto of AFCME, 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/htferlauto030807.pdf. 
11
 See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Putting SEC Heat on Audit Firms and Corporate Tax Shelters: Responding to Tax Risk with 
Sunshine, Shame and Strict Liability , 29 J. CORP. L. 219, 222 (2004). 
12
 Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 368-76 (1999); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 591, 593-94 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan, Alternative Sanctions]; Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully 
Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2160-65 
(2001); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1882-4 (1991); James 
Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1056-59, 1087-89 (1998). For a 
brilliant piece on the role of shame in corporate law, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1811, 1811-13 (2001). 
13
 Siobhan Hughes & Kaja Whitehouse, Labor Fights Verizon Board over CEO’s Compensation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 
2007, at A3 (quoting AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Richard Trumka as saying, “I defy anybody to say this guy’s earned 
the money” and calling Verizon “the poster child for pay for pulse” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Glass Lewis’ 
labeling of Kenneth Langone, a member of NYSE’s board who defended Grasso’s pay package as a “‘chronic 
overpayer,’” is another example of shaming. Troy Wolverton, AFL-CIO’s Throw-the-Bum-Out Call Gets Cool 
Reception, THE STREET, Sept. 26, 2003, http://www.thestreet.com/print/story/10116076.html. 
14
 The AFL-CIO called for Kenneth Langone, a director of the NYSE board who defended Richard Grasso’s 
compensation package, to be dropped from the board of GE and four other public companies. See Wolverton, supra note 
13; Kaja Whitehouse, CEO Compensation Survey, Wall Street Journal, 4/9/2007, R4, quoting Joe Grundfest: “Directors 
are highly sensitive to public criticism ….a large number of directors don’t do it for the money.” 
15
 Some believe that shareholders are only motivated by the desire to make money. See JOHN R. NOFSINGER, THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING xi (2002) (“An old Wall Street adage states that two factors move the market: fear 
and greed. Although true, this characterization is far too simplistic. The human mind is very sophisticated, and 
human emotions are very complex. The emotions of fear and greed just don’t adequately describe the psychology 
that affects people.”). 
16
 Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 
(1992) (defining an epistemic community as a “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
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groups, whether they are other corporate boards, or clubs and other organizations.17 Such 
networks are conducive to the deployment of social sanctions because membership benefits are 
dependent on reputation. Even if the particular director or CEO is shameless, the very process of 
interaction with others who might experience shame facilitates norm internalization in potential 
corporate directors.18  
This Article will explore attempts by norm entrepreneurs to create or modify social 
norms, and their implications for the CEO compensation debate. It argues that the relevant social 
norms are in a state of flux because of the work of norms entrepreneurs, whose efforts might 
reduce the need for legislative intervention.19 Several new norms like majority voting for board 
election, 20 say on pay,21 smaller multiples for severance packages,22 and respect for shareholder 
activists23 may be emerging due to the work of norms entrepreneurs. This argument draws on 
social norms scholarship and applies it to the problem of excessive CEO pay in new ways.24 Part 
II analyzes the rich literature on social norms to determine if there are models capable of 
                                                                                                                                                             
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”). 
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 Lisa Fairfax, "Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women, People of Color, and the Unique Issues 
Associated with Women of Color". 79 St. John's L. Rev. 1105, 2005 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=921037 
18
 See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 12, at 639. Professor Kahan argues that shaming has the effect of shaping 
preferences. If individuals are shamed for contravening a particular asserted norm, other observers will modify their own 
behavior to fit that asserted norm. 
19
 The CEO of Home Depot responded to a question about the excessiveness of his predecessor Nardelli’s pay 
saying: 'It's like tectonic plates are shifting, and human beings get caught between those shifting plates. We are 
seeing a kind of societal shift in terms of how much shareholders are willing to pay C.E.O.s.' Joe Nocera, Speaking 
Up In Fresh Air At Home Depot, 5/26/07 N.Y. Times C1, 2007 WLNR 9883357. 
20
 Jena McGregor, Activist Investors Get More Respect, 6/11/07 Bus. Wk. 34 
2007 WLNR 10599687. (“The most widely adopted reform this year has been majority voting. First introduced three 
years ago, the new rule means directors must be elected by more than 50% of shareholder votes rather than just by a 
plurality. For meetings so far this year, 57% of the proposals on this topic have been withdrawn after shareholders either 
negotiated deals or companies agreed to adopt the new rule--up from 25% this time last year.”); Kaja Whitehouse, CEO 
Compensation Survey, Wall Street Journal, 4/9/2007, R4 (“At the start of February, 52% of companies in the Standard & 
Poor’s 500-stock index had adopted majority voting, up from 16% a year earlier.) 
21
 Id. ("Say on pay" proposals ... were filed at 66 companies this year after first finding their way to the ballot in 2006. 
Although only two companies, Blockbuster Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc., have seen the idea win more than 
50% of votes, many votes came flirted with a majority. The average vote on the issue so far this year is 43%, up from 
40% last year.”) The article quotes Stephen M. Davis, president of independent governance consulting firm Davis Global 
Advisors Inc.,: "It's taken off like a rocket…To have the first year of a widespread campaign producing votes with 30% 
to 50% outcomes is unheard of." 
22
 Id. Resolutions requiring shareholder approval for severance packages exceeding 3 times pay received 66% support in 
2007, up from 52% in 2006. 
23
 Id. AFSCME formed a working group to bring together more than 20 companies, unions, and investors to explore ways 
in which say on pay might be adopted by U.S. companies. The article quotes Richard Ferlauto of AFCME: "Five years 
ago we would have never gotten in a corporate boardroom… Now we're regularly meeting with corporate directors about 
substantive issues." 
24
 That social norms can play an important role in promoting cooperative behavior is well documented. See Ernst Fehr & 
Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980, 980, 984 (2000), 
available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/chairs/fehr/team/fehr/publications/coop_pun.pdf. 
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application to better correlate executive compensation with performance. Despite several 
problems at the definitional level, it argues that the actions of constituencies relevant to the CEO 
pay debate might be explained by signaling, esteem, and expressive theories. Further, social 
norms theories neglecting internalization are deficient; corporate actors undertake self-
improvement only when they internalize norms. Part III identifies the work of norms 
entrepreneurs in creating or changing norms pertaining to CEO compensation, and analyzes the 
reasons for their success. The examples considered demonstrate the effects of dynamic normative 
transformations on corporate actors and illustrate the contrast in behavioral changes 
accompanying resistance and acceptance of new norms. Part IV concludes that norm creation in 
corporate law is facilitated by the role of groups where membership benefits are dependent on 
reputation; that directors cannot tradeoff reputation like CEOs, making the deployment of 
reputational sanctions against them powerful; that behavioral change is more effective when 
there is norm internalization; and that norms entrepreneurs ought to focus on socializing relevant 
actors if they aspire to be successful in achieving normative change. In doing the above, this 
Article seeks to make a contribution by opening up new areas for the study of the ways in which 
social norms change in response to the actions of norms entrepreneurs and suggests options for 
legislators and regulatory bodies in meeting demands for intervention. 
 
PART II: SOCIAL NORMS 
There is a growing body of scholarship analyzing the role of norms in society. 25 This 
fecund literature sheds light on the expressive dimensions of labeling conduct as prosocial or 
antisocial.26 Tapping into insights from this literature could provide a rich vein of material for the 
CEO compensation debate because of its emphasis on the role of groups and the participation of 
actors therein, factors that are very much in play in corporate law. It also suggests alternatives to 
the regulation versus free-market arguments that plague the debate amongst corporate law 
scholars.  
The norms debate has seemingly been unhindered by the considerable disagreement at the 
definitional level.27 In the conception of some scholars, “norm” means only decentralized or 
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 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard H. 
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Eric A. Posner, The 
Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 
(1996); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. L. REV. 365 (1997); 
Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). Owing to the number of 
scholars at the University of Chicago doing this work, some have referred to it as the “New Chicago School.” See, 
e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998) [hereinafter Lessig, The New 
Chicago School]. 
26
 See McAdams, supra note 25, at 341-42. 
27
 There have been at least four law review symposia on the topic, and hundreds of articles. See, e.g., Dan Kahan & 
Lawrence Lessig (eds), Symposium Issue on Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 
27(2) J. LEGAL STUD. (1998).  
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informal rules, to the exclusion of organizational rules.28 Other scholars include both 
organizational and informal rules within the definition of norms.29 There are yet other scholars 
who treat legal obligations also as norms.30  
Some scholars are more functionalist in their approach and approach norms as a way to 
craft efficient solutions.31 Sunstein defines “social norms” as “social attitudes of approval and 
disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. . . . [with regard 
to] nearly every aspect of human behavior.”32 In a series of brilliant articles on the subject, 
Richard McAdams defines norms as “informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated 
to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal 
sanctions, or both.”33 He distinguishes between a social norm and a convention: the former is a 
behavioral regularity that is 
[s]ustained in part by the fact that individuals generally approve . . . conformity 
and/or disapprove . . . non-conformity. Norms are, therefore, perceived by 
individuals in the relevant population as obligatory, a regularity one “ought” to 
follow, whether or not they are justified in moral theory. . . . [and they are] 
generally followed by the individuals in a population.34  
 
This “ought” element is the key to an act becoming a norm and transforms it from a 
“mere aspiration” into conduct requiring obedience. McAdams’s model is predicated on the costs 
of enforcement being very low; the only requirements for norm enforcement are “simple attitudes 
of being positively or negatively inclined toward – liking or disliking – the behavior.”35 In 
contrast, conventions (such as doffing one’s hat at an acquaintance to show respect or 
recognition) do not implicate any kind of sanctioning behavior.36 This is arguable because the 
violation of the hat doffing convention can also come at a price; the acquaintance that is subject 
to one’s failure to doff might retaliate in kind, or in other ways.  
In the sanctioning respect, both conventions and norms are similar; the existence or 
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 See ELLICKSON, supra note 6, at 130-31. 
29
 See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); McAdams, supra note 25, at 351.  
30
 See McAdams, supra note 255, at 340.  
31
 Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 215, 224-26 (1994). 
32
 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996). 
33
 McAdams, supra note 255, at 340. McAdams defines it as “a regularity of behavior among a population of individuals, 
the central feature of which is that most or all of the individuals approve conformity to the regularity and/or disapprove 
non-conformity.” Richard H. McAdams, Conventions and Norms: Philosophic Aspects, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 2735 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter McAdams, Conventions]. 
34







otherwise of a sanction is not the differentiating characteristic of norms vis-à-vis conventions. 
What, then, is the difference? Robert Scott writes that conventions are “behavioral regularities 
that are commonly observed, such as serving dessert after dinner and not before,” whereas norms 
“are behavioral regularities that create an obligation to obey.”37 This sense of obligation springs 
“either from an internalized sense of duty, or from a fear of external sanctions such as shaming or 
shunning, or from both.”38 Scott critiques McAdams’s model on the ground that shaming is not 
costless as he asserts, arguing that if it were, “then the information the law transmits about the 
preferences of others . . . no longer has any role to play in the analysis. After all, nothing can 
lower the cost of something that is already costless.”39 Scott recognizes that “shaming carries 
both benefits and costs;”40 and people engage in a cost-benefit calculus prior to engaging in 
shaming behavior, acting only if the benefits exceed the costs.41 He acknowledges the secondary 
benefits accruing to the enforcer in terms of the effect that enforcement has in conveying to 
bystanders that the enforcer is a “good type.”42 Scott writes that this more nuanced reading means 
that “the law not only provides information about others’ expected behavior, but it also provides 
a justification for norm enforcers to speak out by affirming the appropriateness of their 
preexisting preferences.”43 
For McAdams, social norms can spring forth informally through familiar negative 
vehicles such as censure, ostracism, gossip, and violence, just as equally as through positive ones 
like praise and material incentives.44 McAdams acknowledges the internal element to social 
norms: the existence of feelings like pride and guilt that accompany normative behavior.45 His 
esteem model is predicated on people having the ability to make “evaluative options” about 
others.46 It is sufficient that people direct opinions at the behavior of others and that the opinions 
are shared by members of the public.47 Unlike other scholars, McAdams does not require 
agreement from a majority of the population for the constitution of a norm.48 Norm creation takes 
place through “selfish esteem allocation,” “group discussion,” and “exit.”49 If the particular 
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 Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1610 (2000). 
Scott conceded that “the distinction between conventions and norms is fuzzy. Often conventions, such as table 
manners, become normative over time in the sense that deviation is subject to social sanctions and, in turn, creates a 














 McAdams, Conventions, supra note 333, at 2739. 
45
 See McAdams, supra note 25, at 407-08. 
46






 Id. at 360. 
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behavior is commendable and its absence deplorable, a norm will emerge.50 There must be 
substantial agreement, and common knowledge as to this fact.51 In this scenario, the esteem cost 
is the “probability that a violation of the consensus will be detected multiplied by the value of the 
esteem that would then be lost.”52 Upon the identification of the esteem cost, an esteem-based 
norm emerges obligating persons to engage in the particular behavior when, for most people, 
“this esteem cost exceeds the cost of following the consensus.”53  
It is true that inflicting any kind of sanction is costly.54 Even in the McAdams esteem 
model,55 the very act of withholding esteem is not as costless as he suggests. The enforcer is not 
free from costs just because he only withholds esteem. Even if the sanction is relatively passive, 
such as shunning or avoiding the wrongdoer, there is still a price that has to be paid.56 This may 
be awkwardness experienced when the enforcer unintentionally comes into contact with the 
offender or a direct confrontation by the offender demanding to know why the enforcer is 
avoiding him. Regardless of what form the cost takes, there is little doubt that it exists, measured 
by the enforcer’s position post-sanction relative to his position pre-sanction.  
In many instances, this cost is only borne by the enforcer, despite the benefit being shared 
by the non-participating bystander.57 To be sure, benefits of a secondary nature may accrue to the 
enforcer; these include the conveyance of an appearance of courage, integrity, and willingness to 
enforce the norm - all adding up to show that the enforcer is a good type. Some enforcers are 
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 Id. at 358. (“[T]he desire for esteem produces a norm. For some behavior X in some population of individuals, a norm 
may arise if (1) there is a consensus about the positive or negative esteem worthiness of engaging in X (that is, either most 
individuals in the relevant population grant, or most withhold, esteem from those who engage in X); (2) there is some risk 
that others will detect whether one engages in X; and (3) the existence of this consensus and risk of detection is well-
known within the relevant population.”) 
51
 Id. at 358-65. (“When these conditions exist, the desire for esteem necessarily creates costs of or benefits from 
engaging in X. If the consensus is that X deserves esteem, a norm will arise if the esteem benefits exceed, for most people, 
the costs of engaging in X.”). 
52




 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 211-12 (1981); Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the 
Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan’s Laws, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 363 (2005) (contending that “[i]n 
the context of SORNLs, for example, these costs include setting up notification websites, updating these websites, 
tracking down offenders, and actively notifying communities”). Teichman asserts that “Non-legal sanctions are 
unique because through their use, the government can externalize some of the costs of sanctioning to the public.” 
Id. at 364 n.38. 
55
 See McAdams, Conventions, supra note 333, at 2739. The esteem model has traction in the CEO compensation context 
because people with high self-esteem are more likely to respond to the withholding of esteem. See Jones, supra note 9, at 
144. 
56
 See, e.g., Julia A. Houston, Note, Sex Offender Registration Acts: An Added Dimension to the War on Crime, 28 GA. 
L. REV. 729, 732-33 (1994) (pointing out problems of implementing SORNLs associated with their costs); Denise M. 
Bonilla & Joy L. Woodson, Continuing Debate Over Megan’s Law, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003, at B2 (California 
Attorney General pointing out that verifying registration would cost the state $15 million to $20 million which is a “hefty 
request” given the California budget deficit). 
57
 McAdams, supra note 255, at 352-53. 
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“shame-centered,”58 and do not interact with those who are shamed. By showing that he is a good 
type, in some circumstances the enforcer could also be trying to stave off a sanction against 
passivity that other enforcers might impose.59 This sanction might take the form of the passive 
person being labeled a coward, being shunned as lacking a strong moral core, and so on. There 
are instances of people who do not participate in consumer boycotts being punished in various 
ways, apparently exemplifying that passivity may not always be costless.60 This secondary 
sanctioning is often under-analyzed by legal scholars who write about shaming. In the absence of 
effective secondary shaming, the free-rider problem becomes a serious obstacle to the effective 
deployment of shame sanctions.61 
 
1. Signaling Model 
Eric Posner proposed a model of social norms suggesting they are a communication or 
“signaling” device enabling reliable transaction partners to find each other and enter into 
cooperative transactions.62 For Posner, the “discount rate” that individuals possess is the most 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
58Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Shame: Why More Shaming May Deter Less 5 (Aug. 24, 2005) 
(unpublished working paper, on file at http://ssrn.com/abstract=789244) (“They do not care whether the individuals 
they interact with are offenders or not. They are, however, reluctant to interact with shamed individuals. Such 
reluctance may be attributed to the unwillingness to be publicly observed interacting with shamed individuals. 
Interaction with the shamed might signal to third parties that those interacting with them are also ‘bad types.’”). 
59
 This is the idea behind the signaling theory postulated by Eric Posner, whereby people are either “cooperators” who 
have a low discount rate, or “cheaters” who have a high discount rate. See Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social 
Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 767-72 (1998). Cooperators and cheaters all play repeated games 
in which the former maximize their payoffs by interacting among themselves. Id. To exclude cheaters, cooperators can 
use costly signals that only individuals who expect the high, long-term cooperative payoff can afford to send. Id. at 768-
69. The cost incurred by the sanctioning party is exactly what makes the infliction of the non-legal sanction a credible 
signal. Id. at 768. People who are passive are seen to be non-cooperators and are excluded from profitable interactions 
with cooperators. See id. at 770. 
60
 MONROE FRIEDMAN, CONSUMER BOYCOTTS: EFFECTING CHANGE THROUGH THE MARKETPLACE AND THE MEDIA 136 
(1999) (describing how the Jewish boycott against German goods during World War II was rigorously enforced by non-
legal sanctions); William Muraskin, The Harlem Boycott of 1934: Black Nationalism and the Rise of Labor-Union 
Consciousness, 13 LAB. HIST. 361, 364 (1972) (presenting a case in which the photographs of boycott violators were 
published in a local newspaper); Sankar Sen et al., Withholding Consumption: A Social Dilemma Perspective on 
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valuable piece of information in making decisions about their suitability for entering into 
cooperative relationships.63 Some individuals are willing, as a matter of disposition, to incur 
short-term losses in pursuit of longer-term cooperative gains;64 these individuals are “good 
types.”65 In contrast, other individuals are disposed to defect from cooperative endeavors 
whenever they can obtain short-term benefits from defection-oriented strategic actions;66 such 
individuals are “bad types.”67 In the marketplace for cooperative transactions, it is in the interest 
of good types to reveal their low discount rate to potential transacting parties, by acting in ways 
that reveal their dispositions.68 Similarly, it is also in the interest of bad types to seek cooperative 
interactions with good types because of the obvious payoffs from such interactions.69 Thus, all 
actors have an interest in signaling a low discount rate if they wish to engage in cooperative 
transactions.70 However, for this to work effectively, it must not be possible for everyone to send 
such signals.71  
As Posner writes, “[s]ignals reveal type if only the good types, and not the bad types, can 
afford to send them, and everyone knows this.”72 Signals are distinguished from non-signals by 
norms entrepreneurs, who function as the arbiters. It is unclear as to what process is used, how 
norms entrepreneurs choose behaviors qualifying as signals, and what causes others to accept this 
characterization. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, it seems to fall into the territory of 
taste, which Posner expressly excludes in his model. 
Posner contends that manners and fashion – the way one holds a fork, for example – are 
signals of one’s discount rate.73 His argument is only true in very small groups that share certain 
common attributes.74 If one were to dine at Oxford, for example, one would only pass the Port to 
the left. Such a rule would be completely unknown in the United States, as this author can attest 
from experience.75 Signals of this nature cannot work in modern diverse societies, and Posner 
exaggerates their value in the evaluative process leading to the determination about whether an 
individual is a “good type,” or is a suitable cooperative partner. To be sure, Posner might respond 
that passing Port to the left is a signal at an Oxford college table. Observers might believe, inter 
alia, that one who passes Port to the right comes from a lower class, has no manners, is poor, 
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absentminded, careless, or contemptuous of social rules. While these are plausible conclusions 
based on the behavior, they may not affect that person’s ability to enter into cooperative 
relationships in any meaningful sense because of the multi-layered nature of the partner selection 
process. It is very conceivable that these conclusions about a person, based on passing the Port in 
the wrong direction, actually make him a more attractive cooperation partner, albeit for different 
reasons. 
For Posner, norms do not cause behavior. He argues that “[t]he claim that a social norm 
caused X or Y is an empty claim. The appropriate claim is ‘individuals seeking a or b interacted 
in such a way as to produce behavioral regularities X or Y, regularities that we call ‘social 
norms.’”76 The secondary enforcement of norms by social sanctions such as shaming are also 
calculated to show a low discount rate.77  
Posner’s conception of norms is critiqued by Richard McAdams, expressing doubt about 
his definition of norms.78 He writes that “[t]he behavioral regularities that Posner describes, 
which arise from ‘partial information – either about the value of some activity or about the 
character of people who engage in it’ – might be considered a custom or convention or something 
else, but ‘norm’ seems an odd term if the inhabitants of the theory have no normative 
commitments or beliefs that contribute to the regularity.”79 Posner’s theory also suffers because 
he dispenses with the need for internalization on the grounds that there are no satisfactory 
theories to explain “what kinds of people feel guilt and what kinds of people do not.”80 That we 
do not understand the process of internalization is not a sufficient reason to ignore the need for 
internalization in the creation of norms.  
Posner’s “commitment model,”81 also does not work because the example that he uses – 
teenagers defying social conventions – is a fundamental mischaracterization. It strains logic to 
believe that teenagers act in ways that violate conventional rules because they seek future payoffs 
from other teenagers by cutting off opportunities with the mainstream adult population. In fact, 
frequently this result would not be achieved at all even if the mythical teenager that Posner is 
imagining existed. Almost every teenage act of rebellion is heavily discounted by the adult 
population as stemming from misdirected energies or immaturity, and there is very little 
shrinkage in opportunities for cooperative relationships with adults as a result. Most adults 
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forgive teenage infractions, and all but the naivest teenager is able to perceive this. It is this 
knowledge, that all will be forgiven, that might prompt many kinds of rebellious behavior. Thus, 
many actions by teenagers to act in unconventional ways like having tattoos or piercings have 
very little impact on the availability of adult partners to transact with, if at all they desire such 
transactional opportunities. Therefore, there is very little signaling benefit to teenage 
unconventional behavior in the Posnerian sense.82 To be sure, there are likely to be some adults 
who might be less forgiving, but this group of adults is probably also a fringe or deviant group in 
some sense. 
Despite its limitations, applying Posner’s signaling model to the CEO compensation 
problem offers interesting insights. Directors might attempt to pay CEOs just enough to attract 
the best candidate and ensure optimum performance in order to signal to others their low 
discount rate and their suitablity as candidates for retention on the board and for other board 
appointments. For this to work, norms entrepreneurs should be able to define what constitutes an 
appropriate signal – in other words, the kinds of actions that boards must undertake to show they 
are not overpaying CEOs. Mere statements about shareholder welfare cannot serve as signals 
because they are so cheap as to allow any boardmember to send them. Their actions have to be 
costly enough for observers to separate them from cheap talk. The example of Blockbuster’s 
board negotiating down departing CEO Antioco’s bonus and severance package, discussed in 
Part III, might be illustrative of such signaling. The cost of signaling was the risk of Mr. Antioco 
suing and the possibility that potential replacements would decline the job. Signaling might also 
explain institutional shareholders and labor unions making precatory proposals at annual 
meetings – they are demonstrating low discount rates by engaging in sanctioning behavior. In 
these examples, directors and shareholder activists are not acting out of a belief that a norm has 
been violated; rather, their attempts at signaling a low discount rate might result in the emergence 
of a norm. Posner’s commitment model might also explain the actions of investors who shun “sin 
stocks,” at some cost to themselves. 
 
2. Social Meaning and Expressive Law 
Lawrence Lessig’s work posits that that the social meaning of particular behaviors can 
vary depending on temporal and cultural factors.83 When a particular behavior runs out of favor 
in the public consciousness, it can persist because of the collective action problem that individual 
actions alone cannot solve.84 In such circumstances, the state steps in with legal instruments to 
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change the social meaning of behavior.85 Lessig differentiates social meaning from social norms, 
stating that social norms owe their ability to influence conduct “not from something physical or 
behavioral” but from something that is “interpretive.”86 Lessig emphasizes the need to 
understand “social meaning,” by which is meant the construction that an interpretive community 
gives to a particular act.87 Studies have demonstrated the positive correlation that legal 
intervention can have on prosocial behavior.88 Attaching a legal sanction to behavior can serve to 
engender displeasure and social condemnation. This works by entitling people to impose their 
own forms of sanctions against offenders, conveying to potential offenders, that, aside from the 
legal sanctions, these social sanctions can also be expected to be imposed. The principal example 
for this idea is the broken windows theory whereby fixing broken windows has a positive effect 
on crime rates by showing potential offenders that the neighborhood is unlikely to tolerate 
untidiness, much less criminal behavior.89 Similarly, antismoking measures work mostly in the 
face of negligible enforcement – the law relies on decentralized and privatized empowerment for 
its teeth.90 
McAdams has also written about the ability of the state to modify behavior by 
promulgating law to reveal a latent or imperfectly perceived consensus that existed prior to the 
passage of the law.91 Legislation catalyzes behavioral change by sanctioning deviations at the 
group level.92 The signaling effect of the law ensures that individuals cannot act without the risk 
of incurring the disapproval of other members because that individual is “ignorant of the 
consensus, or incorrectly believes there is no risk of detection.”93 If the ignorance of the 
consensus is pervasive, a norm cannot be produced.94  
 Cass Sunstein also focuses on the expressive effects of the law. He writes that statutes 
such as those targeting littering work even without direct sanctions because people internalize the 
law’s message, and others understand the possibility of being socially ostracized.95 The law only 
works because the social meaning of littering has been altered from the previously perceived 
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exercise of freedom to a display of disrespect for others.96 A “norm cascade” can be catalyzed in 
this manner by altering the preferences and behavior of some subset of society.97 Thereafter, by 
the efflux of time, the behavior reaches a tipping point and a new norm takes root.98 
Expressive theories have explanatory power in the CEO compensation arena. The law can 
change the social meaning of compensation in several ways including: by signaling that pay 
unrelated to performance is undesirable or wrong, by fixing mandatory multiples, by removing 
status benefits from high compensation, and by high taxes. This is at the root of recent legislative 
efforts like the Say on Pay Bill passed by the House, and the SEC compensation disclosure rules. 
 
3. The Need for Norm Internalization 
Social norms are enforced by social sanctions, with effectiveness depending on 
internalization of the norm by the offender.99 As a result of such internalization, the offender 
must believe that his conduct has lowered his reputation either in his own eyes or in the eyes of 
people whose opinion he cares about.100 In the absence of this internal aspect, it is hard to 
distinguish the shame that might flow from a violation of the norm from mere tarnishment of 
reputation. While negative impacts on reputation can be suffered even when the offender does 
not believe that he has committed a wrong, he can only experience shame if the alleged wrong 
accords with norms that have been internalized and is discovered. Rather than feeling some 
semblance of remorse, if the offender were to become angry after being punished, it is very likely 
that the reaction will be an impulse to retaliate against those enforcing the sanction.101 
Confronted with retaliation, the enforcers, in turn, might become angry and engage in a fresh 
round of punishment.102 Thus, multiple rounds of sanctioning behavior can stem from anger at 
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the primary sanction, leading to potentially debilitating social effects.103 If, on the other hand, the 
offender were to experience a sense of remorse, and internalize the sanction, she is less likely to 
feel anger. This will prevent anger-induced rounds of sanctioning behavior and will make the 
punishment effective.104 Studies have shown that shame and guilt can prevent angry responses to 
punishment, supporting the need for internalization.105  
This presents interesting insights for sanctioning excessive CEO pay. If directors 
approving a compensation agreement do not believe that it is excessive, they are likely to be 
angered by the imposition of sanctions against them. It is only when they accept that the 
agreement is not in the interests of shareholders will shaming work because it will touch the 
internal element and motivate them to act differently in the future. If they modify their behavior 
without accepting the excessiveness of the compensation agreement, it is because rational actors 
comprehend the disutility created by the enforcement actions undertaken by norms enforcers. 
Ergo, they might be angered by the sanction, and believe it was undeserved, but nevertheless 
modify their behavior to avoid costs. This will not result in normative change and the change in 
behavior might be temporary. 
Internalization is essential in order for social sanctions to work - this provides the moral 
compass for self evaluation. In the absence of this internal element, the offender would be able to 
categorize the reactions of sanction enforcers as being motivated by ill will, malice, envy, 
jealousy, or some other emotion. After such categorization, it would be relatively easy to be 
unaffected by the sanction. If other people share this categorization, or can be persuaded to 
believe that no wrong has been committed, these attempts at sanctioning would have little or no 
power. Thus, the most important element in ensuring the successful enforcement of sanctions is 
the offender’s internalization of the norm. Social norms can be enforced if there is no detected 
violation (through the invocation of guilt), and if there is no enforcer, but not if the offender has 
not internalized the norm.106  
Some scholars like Richard Posner focus mainly on the external dimension.107 Although 
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he recognizes that shaming has two dimensions, he seems to frequently focus only on the second 
dimension, suggesting that one can experience shame even without violating an internalized 
norm.108 His examples are humiliation rather than shame. It is possible that directors could feel a 
sense of humiliation because norms entrepreneurs publicize a compensation agreement that 
exemplifies CEO greed at its worst, even though they themselves have no internalized norm 
against excessive greed. This will not generate a norm. 
Cooter offers a richer model emphasizing the internalization element, writing that people 
make a moral commitment when they internalize a social norm.109 He suggests that a social norm 
is conduct society consensually says people ought to engage in.110 Agreement about what people 
ought to do is indicative of a possible social norm, but disagreement might be suggestive of a 
struggle to establish a social norm.111 However, this is not a sufficient condition for the 
establishment of a social norm. Cooter’s formulation requires that the social norm be an 
“effective consensus obligation”: people must not only agree that a social norm exists, but must 
act in accordance with that norm.112 Further, “a social norm is ineffective in a community and 
does not exist unless people internalize it.”113 A satisfactory explanation for the process of 
internalization is lacking. Cooter seems content to require a “[u]nanimous endorsement” which 
has the effect of “convinc[ing] some members of the community to internalize the obligation, and 
to inculcate it in the young.”114 This unanimity will occur when conditions necessitate one 
signal.115  
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McAdams disputes the need for internalization, suggesting that the expenditure of time 
necessary for internalization is unnecessary for the emergence of norms. He argues that both 
internalization and noninternalization can produce norms – the difference is that in the former 
case “there is yet another cost to violating a norm: guilt.”116 Norms precede internalization, a 
formulation that is troubling because it does not explain the effect of withholding esteem on 
persons who have no internalized norm against the behavior that is being sanctioned.117 In his 
model, even without internalization, “there will be an esteem cost to acting contrary to a 
consensus as soon as it, and the inherent risk of detection, becomes well-known. If, for most 
people, the cost is higher than the benefit of acting against the consensus, a norm will quickly 
emerge.”118 He seems to be implying that shaming and similar external sanctions produce 
internalization.119  
McAdams seems to have it backwards: people are unlikely to be concerned about 
disesteem when they believe that they are in the right. Others might disagree with them, but this 
will not result in behavioral change unless the offender has internalized the norm and feels 
shame. If others withhold esteem when the person has not internalized the norm, the likely 
response is anger and defiance.120 This will not produce norms.121 McAdams frequently implies 
the need for internalization, but never acknowledges its necessity for his model, despite correctly 
accepting that the mere “[p]ublicizing [of] a consensus will not, by itself, cause individuals to 
feel guilt from violating the law.”122 Yet, he claims (without explaining the origin of the abstract 
internalized norm) that “[i]f the law publicizes a consensus that certain behavior is required in 
order to comply with an abstract internalized norm, then violating the concrete (legal and esteem-
based) obligation will produce guilt.”123 In the absence of internalization, mere publication of a 
law will not induce normative behavior, except in cases involving coordination-type problems. 
These are not in any event, explained by his esteem theory. For example, if the law publicizes a 
requirement that people drive on the right, it could result in behavior that follows the rule, if 
backed up by fines. People have no internalized norm at this point, nor are they driving on the 
right because they believe that there will be disesteem if they drive on the left. If the law is 
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changed the next day and people are asked to drive on the left, once again, there will be a 
behavioral change, if backed up by fines.  
These kinds of behavioral changes are not very sticky because there is no element of 
internalization, regardless of the passage of time. Something deeper than legal promulgation is 
usually needed for people to internalize norms. The role of influential individuals or groups in 
socializing or selling the norm is the missing link. The success or failure of socialization or 
norm-selling depends on the value of the individual or group to the target of the action. When 
parents are selling a norm to their children, the chances of successful reception are especially 
high when the children are young and dependent on the parents. Conversely, when the children 
have moved out of the family home, it is harder for parents to be successful.  
This analogy can be usefully transposed to the corporate context. Influential institutional 
shareholders are more likely to succeed in persuading the board of directors to internalize a norm 
depending on factors such as the size and length of time of their share ownership, ability to move 
the market, capacity to mount a proxy contest, and prior record in proxy contests. In contrast, an 
individual who holds just a few shares is less likely to be successful. In the former case, the 
institutional shareholder is valuable for the board’s survival, much like parents for small 
children. This value is a key determinant in the norm internalization process. 
The consequences of internalization for cooperative and noncooperative settings might 
differ with internalization being beneficial in the former.124 It is precisely this scenario that we 
encounter with CEO compensation. If CEOs engage in structuring their compensation 
agreements purely with a view to get as much money as possible regardless of their performance 
and length of service, it is inevitable that shareholders and regulators will focus on monitoring 
both their compensation agreements and their subsequent performance with greater vigor. This 
will divert resources away from more productive uses, and while both shareholders and CEOs 
will have to bear this cost, it is probable that CEOs bear the brunt of these costs. The large 
number of shareholders brings down individual costs for each shareholder. Several egregious 
compensation agreements will be unraveled by the increased scrutiny. Thus, while the brilliant 
CEO will still command a high compensation package, mediocre and egregiously bad CEOs will 
suffer heavily because of this increased monitoring. Given this reality, all CEOs would be better 
off by internalizing a social norm against excessive compensation. 
The nub of Cooter’s argument is that positive law can influence rational actors to change 
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their character by facilitating internalization.125 Ergo, if a law sanctions CEO greed, it is likely 
that CEOs would be influenced to be less greedy. This is a costly solution, and shaming might be 
a cheaper alternative.126 If the ability to publicize egregiously high CEO pay exists, it is likely 
that CEOs will be influenced to be less greedy to avoid condemnation for greed. Abstinence 
signals to shareholders that they can be relied upon to manage the company’s assets in a manner 
most beneficial to the owners of those assets. Excessive CEO pay, on the other hand, signals to 
the shareholders that they are not good participants in cooperative settings and that they are not 
good managers of the shareholders’ assets. This works more effectively if the agreements are 
made public prior to being signed, as the signaling has consequence only before the CEO is 
hired, because in many cases the CEO may not be in the market for another job after demiting 
office.127 If, however, the information is released prior to hiring, and if the shareholders decide 
that the demands are excessive, it has the effect of signaling to shareholders of other companies, 
where the person is a candidate for a similar position, that she is not a good type, and will 
negatively impact the candidate’s marketability. Thus, a law requiring disclosure of proposed pay 
prior to CEO hiring can influence the internalization of a norm against excessive pay, but at 
significant cost. In the case of directors, the signaling function is served both before, and after the 
compensation package has been approved because directors frequently have an interest in being 
reelected and appointed to other boards. Directors will be influenced to monitor and constrain 
pay more effectively because they want to show shareholders that they can effectively manage 
their assets, and that they are attractive candidates for appointment to other boards. 
Professor Cooter’s work provides another interesting element that ties in with the internal 
aspects of normative behavior- the nature of individuals to engage in Pareto self-
improvements.128 The state can facilitate Pareto self-improvements through legal instruments.129 
For example, when the state passes a law banning smoking in public places, many citizens 
internalize the norm against smoking in public places as a Pareto self-improvement.130 Several 
others may obey the law for instrumental reasons.131 When these two factors operate together, a 
new behavior can result.132 In Cooter’s scheme, internalization can be leveraged by the law to 
change preferences by aligning the law with morality, relying upon the innate respect for the law 
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as an instrument, and by relying on self-motivated improvements to stimulate good acts.133  
This concept of Pareto self-improvement might hold saliency for the CEO compensation 
problem. The condemnation of excessive compensation invokes one of the oldest moral offenses 
– greed – making it possible for norms entrepreneurs to create conditions that facilitate Pareto 
self-improvements in corporate CEOs and directors. It is rather optimistic to suppose that the 
average CEO will be stopped by moral objections to greed, but directors, who have less to gain 
from greed in economic terms, will engage in a process of Pareto self-improvement to better 
correlate compensation with performance.  
The self-improvement aspect is crucial because, in the absence of internalization of the 
norm, no amount of legislative or regulatory activity can bring about true social transformation. It 
might succeed in making directors and CEOs more careful, and is more likely to result in the 
invention of new techniques that conceal the true size of compensation packages.134 
Internalization diverts their energies away from such strategies and can create a norm correlating 
pay with performance. There is some evidence that this is not happening in sufficient measure 
and that the relevant actors are still expending energies in socially unproductive ways to conceal 
information so as to stymie the deployment of social sanctions.135 
 
4. The Importance of Networks 
Social norms theories emphasize the role of networks, making them particularly 
amenable to application in the CEO pay debate. McAdams’s esteem-based model is heavily 
dependent on group or network membership – the underlying idea is that we value what other 
people think about us, and constrain our unfettered autonomy by belonging to groups.136 If 
membership is so valuable, the argument is that people will go a long way to preserve it, and 
expulsion from the group serves as a powerful sanction.137 This is confirmed by several 
studies.138 Group membership puts a lid on members’ proclivities to gain advantages by short-
term competitive behavior – based on the idea that these short-term benefits are smaller than 
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those provided by membership in the group.139 
McAdams premises his esteem thesis on the idea that humans are social animals, and that 
acceptance by others is inherently important.140 It does not matter that other rewards flow from 
acceptance.141 If acceptance is its own reward, then people will behave in ways aimed at attaining 
acceptance, even in the absence of other rewards, and the presence of other costs.142 Purely self-
interested behavior will be constrained to the extent that it invites disapprobation, or fails to win 
approbation. 
Group or club membership also has other significant purposes; for example to signal type 
to onlookers. Membership in the Sierra Club signals environmental friendliness, whereas 
belonging to the National Rifle Association, signals conservative credentials. Thus, membership 
itself is a source of information about type.143 In many instances, the cost of membership is low 
relative to the benefits of signaling and individuals join purely to send the signal despite 
disagreeing with the ideology of the group.144 Some scholars give the example of voting as being 
of trivial benefit in terms of costs and benefits (on the idea that each individual vote may be 
worth little), but is engaged in because of the message it conveys to society that the voter is a 
responsible member.145  
Studies have shown that groups establish norms even in incipient or protean conditions, 
and that these norms seem to persist even when the group is absent.146 This has significant 
ramifications for corporate law because shareholders of a company are not a constant group, and 
are organized around a loose set of common values. If weak groups can generate norms, so can 
shareholders of a company. Further, the entire shareholding public constitutes an even looser 
grouping in broader society. This shareholding group can also generate a norm against excessive 
CEO pay. A more relevant group is comprised of directors. Board membership is valuable, and 
shareholder-friendly norms can be generated by this group purely for self-interested reasons. 
Violators can be punished by exclusion. This group has strong incentives for self-policing 
because of the desire to stave off negative attention from competing groups (like shareholder 
activists) because of the risk of tougher regulation resulting from such attention. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
139
 Id. at 138-43. 
140
 McAdams, supra note 255, at 355-57. The core assumption of esteem theory is that people have a preference for 
something that other people can give or withhold at zero cost: esteem. Id. at 365. The assumption serves to avoid the 
collective action problem of norm enforcement. Id. Because esteem is costless it is not subject to a free rider problem. Id. 
at 364. Although the preference for esteem is assumed to be slight, McAdams shows that it can explain even very costly 
norm-guided behavior. 
141
 See id. at 355.  
142
 See id. A similar idea is contained in the peer-pressure based model of Kandel and Lazear. See generally Eugene 
Kandel & Edward P. Lazear, Peer Pressure and Partnerships, 100 J. POL. ECON. 801 (1992). 
143
 POSNER, supra note 62, at.  
144
 Id. at ___.  
145
 This is doubtful given the low voting turnout from the more affluent sections of society in several countries. 
146
 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537, 1548 (2000) (explaining the 
results of Sheriff’s experiments). 
22 
Draft 
Is group size relevant to the operation of norms? McAdams asserts that “[o]n average, the 
smaller the group, the more intensely esteem is valued.”147 This would pose problems in the CEO 
pay context because of the size of the investing public being large. Closer examination reveals 
that McAdams may have it backwards. The smaller the group, the more important and 
unsubstitutable each individual becomes for cooperative interactions. Therefore, regardless of 
esteem, group members have little choice but to engage in cooperative relationships with each 
other. For example, a small village with just two carpenters has little choice but to engage in 
relationships with them although both have reputations for being tardy and delivering poor-
quality work. Analogous situations are commonplace in real life. In fact, if esteem is valued at 
all, it is in larger groupings where cooperative relationships involve meaningful choice 
predicated on accessible information. Rather than group size, the value of esteem is predicated on 
the internalization of some kind of other-regarding norm.  
McAdams might be mistaken when he writes that “[b]y definition, members of an 
individual’s group have more information about the individual than do strangers, and thus the 
esteem of group members tends to matter a great deal more.”148 When people have a great deal of 
information about the individual, the more likely effect is indifference to esteem. This might 
explain the differences in the kinds of interactions in marital and familial relationships depending 
on how much time has elapsed in the relationship. In the early stages of a marriage, it is 
frequently the case that each spouse cares strongly about esteem from the other spouse and their 
families. The longer the marriage lasts, the less concern there is for such esteem, explaining 
perhaps partly, the currency of mother-in-law jokes in popular culture. It is only when people 
know very little about others that there is a quest for esteem, if at all. The key to esteem appears 
to be the importance that the individual confers to the esteem-giver. If the esteem-giver’s opinion 
is not valued, regardless of the size of the group, esteem will not matter as a constraint on 
behavior.149  
Notwithstanding the difficulties identified by this analysis of the process of norm creation 
and enforcement, there are useful lessons for the CEO compensation problem. The shareholder 
wealth maximization norm is commonly accepted in corporate law.150 It is indeed the basis for 
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our whole system of director liability.151 Moreover, the corporate director universe is extremely 
interdependent. Commercial and social linkages are so strong that no director can be oblivious to 
the negative fallouts from violating the norm. These fallouts can, inter alia, take the form of lost 
business opportunities, withdrawal of job offers, the flight of capital, the collapse of the 
company’s stock, the derision of peers, removal from other boards, and expulsion from social 
clubs and professional organizations.  
The esteem model has traction in the CEO compensation area because director candidates 
are substitutable, and given the size of the group, selection is predicated on reputation. The 
efficacy of the model is dependent on the identity of esteem-givers. If CEOs derive esteem from 
other CEOs, expressions of disesteem by shareholders and other actors will not be a constraint. It 
is only if shareholders are the relevant esteem-givers in the eyes of the CEO that disesteem works 
as a constraint. If shareholders have the ability to convey disesteem in a manner that carries teeth, 
through secondary sanctions on directors, or directly through voting, then CEOs have no choice 
but to value their esteem. Unlike CEOs, directors do not have the luxury of looking solely at 
other directors as esteem-givers, and need esteem from shareholders to maintain their positions 
of the board. This makes them ripe targets for shareholders. Norms entrepreneurs and legislators 
ought to direct their energies at ensuring disesteem from the relevant esteem-givers if sanctions 
have to be effective. 
5. Norm v. Law 
Norms are not born of formal processes of promulgation, which can be both an advantage and a 
disadvantage. It can often be the latter because of the absence of the pathways that conventional 
legislation offers for improvement and amendment.152 Amendment is frequently dependent on 
the agendas of norms entrepreneurs and their ability to leverage the support of the state.153 The 
absence of formal processual checks can also allow the amendment process to be hijacked by 
lobbies and there is an element of democratic deficit that can be troubling.154It is small 
consolation that the formal legal process is beset by the same interest group pressures.  
There, however, is a marked advantage enjoyed by norms in terms of their malleability. 
Legislation runs the risk of fossilization because of the relative difficulty of achieving the 
processual support for effecting amendments. The status quo can also be in a state of petrification 
due to constraints on legislative time and political costs associated with enacting new legislation. 
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PART III: THE ROLE OF NORMS ENTREPRENEURS 
1. Norms Entrepreneurs Defined 
The literature on social norms has introduced the concept of “norm entrepreneur,” a term 
popularized by Cass Sunstein.155 While the term is not free from objections, in the interest of 
harmony within the social norms scholarship, this Article will continue with its use. A norm 
entrepreneur is an agent responsible for the invention or evolution of new social norms.156 
Ellickson defines “norm entrepreneurs” as people who “possess a relatively high level of 
technical knowledge relevant to the norms within [their] specialty. . . . [and are] likely to be 
cognizant that there are appreciative experts . . . who are likely immediately to esteem the norm 
entrepreneur for trying to change the social practice at issue.”157 “Change agents” are also 
suppliers of new norms.158 Technical knowledge and leadership skills allow them to bear the 
opportunity costs of norm reform. Norm entrepreneurs are likely to be more successful at 
creating norms than the state because of their embeddedness in the community.159 Norm 
entrepreneurs create new norms by blatantly acting in a way that defies or transcends existing 
social norms, signaling to observers that they, in turn, should copy the new behavior.160 If this is 
taken up by the observers, a new norm can result.161 Elected representatives,162 high-profile 
CEOs and corporate leaders,163 institutional shareholders, blue ribbon panels, proxy firms, and 
the media can work as norm entrepreneurs in the corporate law area.164 
Norm entrepreneurs do not create new norms for altruistic reasons; acting as a norm 
entrepreneur can result in economic benefits.165 Commercial entities might act as norms 
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entrepreneurs when they “use advertisements to promote a style of life that requires the purchase 
of their goods.”166 In Posner’s signaling model, senders of signals rely on “the suggestions of 
authoritative norm entrepreneurs . . . . [a]s long as enough senders follow the suggestion of a 
person, he will become an authentic norm entrepreneur.”167 Norms entrepreneurs announce 
certain behaviors as signals in order to ensure that people are able to distinguish signals from 
non-signals. Their payoffs are dependent on the number of people who imitate the issued 
signal.168 Posner’s norm entrepreneurs include “[a]rbiters of taste,” “sellers of consumer goods,” 
consultants, “protocol experts,” academics, journalists, politicians, and political activists.169  
If, as Posner claims, norm entrepreneurs get higher rewards depending on how many 
people follow their signals, it should then be in their interest to cater to the lowest common 
denominator. This undercuts his basic thesis: no useful purpose is served in terms of facilitating 
the choice of partners for cooperative interactions if all of the people or, an overwhelming 
majority is part of the group following the signal. If the model has to work, it is not the number 
of people following the lead of the norm entrepreneur that is the determining factor, but the type 
of people that do. Thus, even a small number of the right type ought to suffice – a point that 
Posner does not address.  
Norms entrepreneurs play a role in the Posnerian scheme in enforcement at the secondary 
level (by social sanctions like shaming, shunning, etc.) by conveying the message that such 
enforcement is a signal. Norm entrepreneurs canvass the punishment of people who deviate, 
helping those who want to signal a low discount rate to engage in this costly signaling 
behavior.170 They also work to clarify signals in order to clear up ambiguities that arise.171 Many 
of the people that Posner regards as norms entrepreneurs cannot be so called at all: celebrities, 
fashion gurus, etc., are not advocating the creation of any norm, most of the time. Their actions in 
terms of purported norm creation may be entirely inadvertent and accidental. Even when people 
follow their lead, they do so not out of any sense of obligation, but out of taste. This explains 
why fads and fashions pass so quickly. There is no element of internalization; all that is 
transpiring in these circumstances is that people are imitating celebrities and their ilk. Mere 
imitation does not create a norm; the conduct must arise out of a sense of obligation. The 
incredibly large number of “celebrities” has contributed to so much dissonance about any given 
fad that there is no meaningful signaling function that can be served by mere imitation for short 
periods of time. Frequently, fads disappear even before their existence is properly acknowledged, 
proving that this type of behavior is not normative. 
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In the McAdams model, when a particular behavior is sought to be entrenched as a norm, 
“[t]he first few members to bear the cost of the idealized behavior X may capture the status of 
‘hero.’”172 Esteem attaches to the early followers of these “heroes.” McAdams recognizes that the 
early movers have to bear the risk of isolation if there are no followers.173 However, he notes that 
the risky gamble is the reason for them to be held in high esteem if they succeed.174 One might, in 
this context, imagine the plight of those who volunteer to perform on television shows or 
sporting contests, risking ridicule, as being similar to these heroes. McAdams’s error is that he 
does not distinguish between ordinary early movers and valuable early movers. This element is 
vital in predicting successful reception of the asserted norm. If the early mover has low value to 
the target – for example, a distant relative in the family context – there is little or no chance that 
his action will be followed. In contrast, if it is a parent, adoption of the norm is likely.  
Despite this, McAdams contends that the very fact that the “hero” decided to engage in a 
particular conduct has the effect of “raising the price others must now pay for refusing to engage 
in that behavior. . . . [W]hen everyone refused to undertake X, the esteem loss from that decision 
was zero. But where some engage in the idealized activity, those who do not are negatively 
distinguished and now bear some loss of esteem.”175 This does not seem to accord with his view 
that the norm entrepreneur bears a risk that no one will follow his lead. If no one follows, or if 
only a few follow, it is unlikely that there is any loss of esteem experienced by those that do not. 
Thus, the mere fact that a norm entrepreneur engaged in a particular conduct does not raise the 
price of nonconformity; it is only when there has been a critical mass of valuable acceptances 
that such a price gets imposed on those who do not follow.  
This concept is captured by Andreas Engert, who identifies “network effects as being a 
key determinant in norm creation.”176 Network effects might help to explain the mixed success of 
attempts at changing social norms in the CEO pay area. The bandwagon effect created by pension 
funds and labor unions, allied with the various attempts at regulatory and legislative intervention 
shows that a norm against CEO greed is a serious candidate for successful reception and 
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entrenchment.177 This might explain the enormous interest in news coverage of CEO 
compensation issues. It is also evidenced by the decision of companies like Aflac to grant 
shareholders a say on pay even without the passage of a resolution at the annual general 
meeting.178  
 
2. Norms Entrepreneurs in the CEO Compensation Arena 
The principal norms entrepreneurs in the CEO compensation arena have been institutional 
shareholders, proxy advisory firms, labor unions, and the media. They have engaged in 
campaigns to pass say on pay resolutions at companies perceived to have compensation 
agreements inadequately correlated to performance. The work of these entrepreneurs has created 
a political climate conducive to legislative action by politicians for instrumental reasons. 
Exemplifying a rare phenomenon, Professor Lucian Bebchuk has emerged as a major norm 
entrepreneur in the CEO compensation area, primarily by dint of his scholarship. His campaign 
to increase shareholder power is primarily by writing and speaking prolifically on the topic.179 
Bebchuk has recently taken a more activist role as a norms entrepreneur by submitting proposals 
at annual meetings at several companies.180 Other norms entrepreneurs have to rely mainly on 
this tactic, as evidenced by the 2006 proxy season witnessing 23.9% of shareholder proposals on 
executive compensation.181 A major example of the proxy route being effectively deployed is the 
work of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) 
pension plan, which sponsored proposals at several corporations aimed at giving shareholders an 
advisory vote on executive compensation, securing 37% and 47% favorable votes at Morgan 
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Stanley and Bank of New York, respectively.182 Some examples of norms entrepreneurs’ work 
will be considered in the following paragraphs. 
 
A. Home Depot 
The company’s weak stock performance seems to have made it a ripe target for the work 
of norms entrepreneurs. In 2005, shareholders approved a non-binding proposal asking the 
company to seek their permission prior to issuing golden parachutes to senior executives.183 The 
proposal required approval of golden parachutes that exceed 2.99 times basic pay and bonus.184 
The main ground for attack was the anger generated by high levels of compensation for CEO 
Nardelli as Home Depot’s stock continued to languish in comparison with its competitor 
Lowe’s.185 Nardelli allegedly made about $245 million during five years when the stock declined 
by 12 percent in contrast to a growth of 140% for Lowe’s.186 Nardelli’s high compensation also 
drew attention because of the possible conflicts of interest created by board members’ close ties 
to him.187 CalPERS, the nation’s largest pension fund, and a major norms entrepreneur, urged 
shareholders to support a proxy proposal giving an advisory vote on pay for the top five 
executives.188 Several norms entrepreneurs, including AFSCME, the Connecticut pension fund, 
CalPERS, and ISS acted in concert to withhold votes from board members.189 The board’s lax 
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 Joseph A. Giannone, Shareholders Reject “Say on Pay”, REUTERS, Apr. 10, 2007, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSN1040609620070410?feedType=RSS. Institutional Shareholder 
Services reports that over sixty proposals of a similar nature have been filed by pension funds and activists this year. See 
2006 Postseason Report: Spotlight on Executive Pay and Board Accountability, available at 
http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2007/07/preliminary_postseason_reports.html.  
183
 Renee Degross, Stockholders flex their muscles, 5/27/05 Atlanta J. & Constitution, F1, 2005 WLNR 8402914. The 
proposal was moved by Trowel Trades, a union investment arm, which called it a “basic fundamental shareholder 
power.” 
184
 Home Depot’s board objected to this claiming that it would “choke[its] ability to …attract, motivate and retain senior 
leadership.” Id. 
185
 Renee Degross, Home Depot Stock a bit of a Wallflower, Atlanta J. & Constitution, F1, 6/17/05, 2005 WLNR 
9596505; Renee Degross, CEO beats peers in pay, 4/15/06 Atlanta J. - Const. B1 
2006 WLNR 6336646 ("The pay for Lowe's former chairman is a quarter of Nardelli's annual pay, and Lowe's has 
outperformed Home Depot in the last six years.") 
186
 California Public Employees Retirement System Calls on Home Depot Shareowners to Support Advisory Executive 
Compensation Proposal, US State News, 5/15/06, 2006 WLNR 8384920. 
187
 Julie Creswell, Gilded Paychecks: Ties That Bind, 5/24/06 N.Y. Times A1 
2006 WLNR 8880885 (“two board members have ties to Nardelli's former employer General Electric, one used Nardelli's 
lawyer to negotiate his own salary and three either sat on other boards with Home Depot's influential lead director 
Kenneth G Langone or have ties to companies doing business with Langone; five of six members of compensation 
committee are active or former chief executives likely influenced by their own high pay.”) 
188
 Id. The chair of CalPERS’ investment committee was quoted as saying “we have lost money on the inability of the 
company to align its interests with shareowners which… is egregious compensation for poor performance.” 
189
 Id. (quoting ISS as saying “poor compensation design, a lucrative employment agreement, and arguably egregious 




enforcement of the shareholder wealth maximization norm was pointed out by the Corporate 
Library, a norms entrepreneur, which included Home Depot in its list of 11 “Pay for Failure 
Companies.”190 Things came to a head when Home Depot ignored the ferment and conducted a 
farcical annual meeting in 2006 with the board choosing not to attend, despite which all members 
were reelected.191 However, ten out of eleven directors at Home Depot received 30 - 36% 
withhold votes,192 with Mr. Nardelli receiving 32 % withhold votes.193 A resolution requiring 
majority voting for director election was passed.194 Richard Ferlauto, a union activist, even 
adopted maverick tactics to promote the say on pay resolution by attending the Home Depot 
meeting wearing a chicken suit.195 There were angry responses from shareholders following this 
meeting and Home Depot was forced to apologize. A few months after the farce, an investor 
threatened a proxy fight.196 The series of events culminated with the resignation of Mr. Nardelli 
in January 2007, much to the satisfaction of his critics.197 The company’s 2007 annual meeting 
was a markedly different affair with shareholder activists being treated with more respect than in 
years past.198 Norms entrepreneurs like Professor Bebchuk enjoyed unprecedented success 
despite owning only ninety shares – his proposal to require two-thirds board approval for 
executive compensation was approved.199 Home Depot exemplified a general willingness to 
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 Id. (“The [performance] target for Mr. Nardelli had been total shareholder return -- share price increases plus 
reinvested dividends -- compared with a peer group, and the company was performing poorly by that measure in 2003…. 
But that year, the board changed the target to one of growth in average diluted earnings per share, which takes into 
account the per share earnings decrease that occurs when stock options are awarded.”) 
191
 Joe Nocera, The Board Wore Chicken Suits, 5/27/06 N.Y. Times C1 
2006 WLNR 9112614 
192
 Id. In a reference to the absence of the directors from the meeting, Gerald W. McEntee, chairman of the AFSCME 
Pension Plan said: “The board of directors at Home Depot abdicated their responsibility and in doing so, they ducked a 
basic accountability obligation to company shareholders. The real question is what are they trying to hide?” Id. at 21. 
193
 Gretchen Morgenson, A Warning Shot by Investors to Boards and Chiefs, 1/4/07 N.Y. Times C1 
2007 WLNR 134864; Chad Terhune & Joann Lublin, At Home Depot, CEO Pay Rage Boils Over in Vote, Wall Street 
Journal, 6/2/2006, A2, quoting ISS’s exec. VP as saying: “[p]ay rage drove the significant withhold vote at Home 
Depot,” and Richard Ferlauto of AFCME as saying “This was a very strong rebuke of the Home Depot directors across 
the board.” 
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 Home Depot Approves Majority Voting, 8/30/06 CFO Mag. for Senior Fin. Executives 2 
2006 WLNR 15549876. 
195
 Id. (reporting that protesters were chanting, "Hey Bob, why are you chicken/while the stock price takes a lickin'?") 
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 Suzanne Kapner, Home Wrecker; Shareholder Battles to Change Management,  12/19/06 N.Y. Post 45, 2006 
WLNR 22125013. Surprisingly, Home Depot said that it planned to meet with the investor to address their concerns; 
The proxy fight did not materialize after the parties reached agreement to give Relational a seat on the board and for 
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Times C1, 2007 WLNR 2244223. 
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 Id. 
198Joe Nocera, Speaking Up In Fresh Air At Home Depot, 5/26/07 N.Y. Times C1 
2007 WLNR 9883357. (“Richard Ferlauto, the director of pension investment policy at the American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees pension fund, led a delegation of shareholder activists that met privately with the 
board's nominating committee.”) 
199Jena McGregor, Activist Investors Get More Respect, 6/11/07 Bus. Wk. 34 
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negotiate with activists to arrive at settlements prior to the meeting.200 For a company that had 
been hostile to shareholder concerns, this was a remarkable turnaround. It is unlikely that 
behavior modification was the result of internalization for all board members, but at least the new 
CEO seems to have internalized relevant norms.201 This is unlikely to have been possible without 
the work of norms entrepreneurs. 
 
 B. Blockbuster 
Blockbuster saw significant activity due to high compensation for its CEO John Antioco despite 
declining business. One of the most significant attacks came from Carl Icahn, its largest 
shareholder, who criticized Antioco’s $51 million pay package as excessive.202 He launched a 
proxy fight and put himself forward for election to the board alongwith two nominees. Other 
norms entrepreneurs like ISS stepped into this proxy battle and advised shareholders to vote for 
the two nominees but not for Mr. Icahn.203 Curiously, Mr. Antioco welcomed ISS’s support 
despite it having opposed his candidates!204 Icahn’s slate handed Mr. Antioco an embarrassing 
defeat at the election.205 Mr. Antioco was reappointed to the board despite previously stating that 
he would resign if defeated, but harsh consequences were impending. In 2007, he was in a 
dispute with the board over bonus payments – the board sought to pay him a 2.28 million bonus 
when Mr. Antioco claimed that he was entitled to $7.65 million.206 The board threatened to pay 
him no bonus if he challenged their decision.207 This unseemly mess culminated in his agreeing 
to leave the position with a bonus of $3.1 million and a severance payment of just $5 million 
                                                                                                                                                             
2007 WLNR 10599687 (quoting Bebchuk saying "I did not expect [they] would be willing to make changes in the bylaws 
in response to a proposal by someone who really is an individual shareholder." McGregor writes that “[a]fter a couple of 
conversations and e-mails with Bebchuk and a discussion with outside counsel, the home-improvement retailer adopted 
the proposal outright. In exchange, Bebchuk agreed to withdraw the resolution.”) 
200
 Id. (“shareholders and boards are negotiating away a near-record number of proposals ahead of meetings. So far this 
year 22% of all proposals have been withdrawn by investors, up from 15% at this point last year.”) 
201
 Joe Nocera, Speaking up in Fresh Air at Home Depot, 5/26/07 N.Y. Times C1 
2007 WLNR 9883357, quoting board member Kenneth Langone. 
202
 Icahn Warns Blockbuster to curb spending, 4/8/05 NY Times C3, 2005 WLNR 5492572; Icahn to Nominate 
Three Directors at Blockbuster, Wall Street Journal, 4/8/05, B6 (“Mr. Icahn said Mr. Antioco’s pay packages are 
“unconscionable”); Blockbuster-Icahn Dispute Intensifies 
Ceo Says Remarks About Spending Are M`isleading', 4/19/05 South Florida Sun-Sentinel 3D 
2005 WLNR 23659508 (“Antioco said his pay package, including $2.05 million in salary, a bonus of $5 million, 
restricted stock worth $26.8 million, options on 5 million shares and other compensation of $153,500, was designed 
by independent directors to "align my interests with the interests of Blockbuster's shareholders."”) 
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 Firm supporting two of Icahn's allies, 5/4/05 Ft. Worth Star-Telegram C1 
2005 WLNR 6966250. 
204
 Id. (quoting him: “"I'm pleased ISS has recommended that shareholders withhold their vote from Mr. Icahn and 
believes that my removal from the board is not warranted…”) 
205
 Dissident Icahn Wins Board Seat at Blockbuster, Wall Street Journal 5/12/05, A1.  
206
 Icahn Seeks to Pare Bonus of Blockbuster Chief, Wall Street Journal 2/28/2007 B11; CEO is seeking bigger bonus, 





with two years left on his contract.208 Mr.Icahn’s influence was evident in the hard negotiations 
that reduced the severance payment from $13.5 million under Antioco’s contract to the eventual 
$5 million, bringing to sharp relief the poor work of Disney’s board in paying staggering 
severance amounts to its CEO, Michael Ovitz.209 The success of such an aggressive strategy 
ought to inspire other boards to negotiate with CEOs on their way out.210 In a further victory for 
shareholder activists, Mr. Antioco’s replacement was offered significantly less salary and bonus 
in addition to being required to buy $3 million worth of stock in the company.211 
 
Mr. Icahn was not the only norms entrepreneur at work at Blockbuster - the New York City 
Employees’ Retirement System (“NYCERS”) championed a say on pay resolution in 2007 and 
obtained 57% support.212 The proposal had been vehemently opposed by the board in language 
very similar to that used at several other companies.213 Following its defeat, the company tersely 
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 Blockbuster Chief Agrees To Exit Deal, 3/21/07 N.Y. Times C1 
2007 WLNR 5326101. 
209
 Id. quoting Mr. Icahn: “I really believe contracts like this are one of the things wrong with corporate America. When 
you have these huge severance packages, it so obviously undermines any type of accountability.' Further, 'I feel the 
contract has been sort of an albatross around the company's neck…'You should reward people if the stock goes up. You 
shouldn't have contracts like this.' 
210
 Video giant slashes exit pay, Blockbuster's CEO agrees to a deal to leave by year-end for 62% less than he had 
expected, 3/21/07 L.A. Times 3 
2007 WLNR 5329127, quoting Bill Coleman, senior vice president of Salary.com: "This opens the door to other 
boards and compensation committees saying, 'Look at what happened at Blockbuster in March of 2007.” 
211
 CEO Takes Stock In Firm's Future, 7/8/07 Ft. Worth Star-Telegram F1 
2007 WLNR 12920554. Jim Keyes, the new CEO also had to make do without perks like country-club dues, car 
allowances, etc. 
212
 See Blockbuster Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 55-56 (Dec. 13, 2006), available at 
http://google.brand.edgar-
online.com/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHTML1?SessionID=RRRTWOqVF_ZMuNV&ID=5073909#DDE
F14A_HTM_TX90974_49 (“The results of such a vote would… provide …useful information about whether 
shareholders view the company’s senior executive compensation, as reported each year, to be in shareholders’ best 
interests.”). 
213
 See id. at 56. The opposing statement from the board of directors included the following: 
The proponent’s suggested “FOR” or “AGAINST” vote on selected portions of our 
annual executive compensation disclosures would not provide our Board with meaningful 
information about our stockholders’ various viewpoints on complex executive compensation 
matters.  
As recognized by the SEC’s recent overhaul of companies’ executive compensation 
disclosures, executive compensation policies, practices and determinations have become 
increasingly complex and must take into account a number of factors. We believe that the 
complexity and breadth of information that boards of directors and compensation committees 
consider and evaluate in connection with executive compensation decisions is fundamentally at 
odds with the proponent’s suggestion of annually requesting a “For” or “Against” ratification on 
selected portions of our overall executive compensation disclosures. As a result, we believe that 
the proposal, even if implemented, would not provide our Board with meaningful input regarding 
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stated “[the proposals] are non-binding, so our board will take them under advisement,”214 
apparently unchastened by the message delivered by shareholders.  
 The actions of Blockbuster’s management and board might be indicative of non-
internalization. Humiliation pressured behavioral modification, but it is unlikely to result in 
improvements to corporate governance practices unless there is some indication of 
internalization of the relevant norms. All the statements emanating from Blockbuster point to a 
reluctance to yield to the actions of norms entrepreneurs, suggesting that while they may have 
been successful in achieving desirable results in the short term, long term change might only 
come at greater cost. 
 
C. Verizon 
Verizon shareholders adopted a Say on Pay resolution by a vote of 50.18%, giving norms 
entrepreneurs one of their earliest successes.215 In addition, 46% voted in favor of the 
“Golden Parachutes” proposal advocated by the AFL-CIO - purportedly aimed at loopholes 
in Verizon’s current policy for shareholder approval of golden parachutes.216 The policy 
allowed shareholders to vote on severance agreements that exceed 2.99 times base salary plus 
bonus, but did not include retirement benefits, stock awards or tax reimbursements in that 
calculation.217 The AFL-CIO proposal was geared at eliminating the possibility of severance 
                                                                                                                                                             
our stockholders’ various positions on complex executive compensation matters. Instead, we 
believe that the proposal creates a risk that the vote results may send an inaccurate or incomplete 
message to our Board, rather than communicating the actual and numerous viewpoints of our 
stockholders on particular aspects of our executive compensation program. 
  
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
214
 Moira Herbst, Blockbuster Gives a “Say on Pay”, BUS. WK., May 11, 2007, 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/may2007/db20070511_961122.htm (quoting Angelika 
Torres, director of Blockbuster’s investor relations division); See also,  
http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2007/05/first_majority_for_say_on_pays.html. 
215
 Verizon, 2006 Annual Report & 2007 Annual Meeting Materials, 
http://investor.verizon.com/financial/quarterly/annual_report.aspx (last visited February 19, 2008). 
216Verizon Holders Pass Say-on-Pay Plan, Wall Street Journal, 5/19/2007, A3. 
217
 See VERIZON COMMC’NS INC., 2007 PROXY STATEMENT 14 (2007), available at 
http://investor.verizon.com/financial/quarterly/pdf/proxy_07.pdf.  
[S]everance agreements as described in this resolution, commonly known as “golden parachutes”, 
are excessive in light of the high levels of compensation enjoyed by senior executives at the 
Company and U.S. corporations in general. The Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) survey of 
16 shareholder proposals to restrict golden parachutes in 2006 showed they averaged 51.2% of the 
vote and obtained majority support at six companies.  
 
We believe that requiring shareholder approval of such agreements may have the 
beneficial effect of insulating the Board of Directors from manipulation in the event a senior 




agreements being structured in order to take advantage of this loophole.218 Another proposal 
requiring Verizon to disclose information pertaining to the assessment of the compensation 
consultants’ independence failed narrowly after receiving 47% votes in favor.219 The AFL-
CIO also launched a campaign against members of the board who allegedly rewarded CEO 
Ivan G. Seidenberg with excessive compensation despite the company’s stock 
underperforming.220 
 
The evidence from Verizon shows the emergence of company-specific norms entrepreneurs. One 
such is the Association of BellTel Retirees, an organization representing 100,000 retirees from 
Verizon and predecessor companies such as Bell and Nynex.221 This group owns about $6,000 
worth of Verizon stock, and has been orchestrating shareholder proposals for about ten years.222 
In 2004, it won shareholder approval for a proposal to limit executive severance packages to less 
than 2.99 times base salary and bonus, a measure that has echoes at other companies.223 If 
Verizon’s board decides to go above that ceiling, it has to get approval from shareholders.224 In 
2007, it targeted the CEO, Seidenberg’s $75.1 million in total expected compensation in the five 
years preceding 2005, as excessive because the return for shareholders over that period was 
minus 26.8%.225 The language used by this group leverages the power of a norm against greed: 
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 See id.  
“Benefits” include lump-sum cash payments (including payments in lieu of medical and 
other benefits); the payment of any “gross-up” tax liability; the estimated present value of periodic 
retirement payments; any stock or option awards that are awarded under any severance agreement; 
any prior stock or option awards as to which the executive’s access is accelerated under the 
severance agreement; fringe benefits; and consulting fees (including reimbursable expenses) to be 
paid to the executive. 
Id. 
219
 Id. at 16. They refer extensively to the work of Professor Bebchuk and in the supporting statement point out that: 
The New York Times reported that the independence of the Company’s Consultant is open to 
question, revealing that the Company’s Consultant provides other services for the Company. The 
article suggests that the Company’s compensation consultant has a long and lucrative relationship 
with the Company, maintained at the behest of the executives whose pay it recommends. 
 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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 Tomoeh Murakami Tse, AFL-CIO Goes After 6 Verizon Directors, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2007, at D1, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/19/AR2007041902367.html?hpid=sec-business. 
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Execs, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Apr. 20, 2007, available at 
http://timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?storyID=582473&category=BUSINESS&newsdate=4/20/2007. 
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 Leonard, supra note 224. 
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 Id.; see also SEC Info., Ass’n of Belltel Retirees, Verizon Commc’ns Inc., Notice of an Exempt Proxy 
Solicitation (Apr. 5, 2004), available at http://www.secinfo.com/d157vj.1d.htm (“It’s no wonder that the widely-
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“How many Verizon retirees – or Verizon shareholders – do you know with $10 million, $20 
million, or $30 million in ‘supplemental’ pension benefits? Please vote FOR this proposal to 
clamp down on this excessive and non-performance-based compensation.”226 
 
D. Other examples 
The AFL-CIO and the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds attacked the $83 million 
retirement package for Pfizer CEO Henry McKinnell before its annual meeting in 2007, and an 
investor group organized a “vote no” campaign.227 In accordance with recent practice, there was 
an attempt at pinning responsibility on members of the compensation committee who had 
approved the compensation agreement and two members of the company’s compensation 
committee received twenty-one percent withhold votes.228 In a show of ire at the SEC’s decision 
to allow Pfizer to leave out the AFL-CIO’s proposal seeking shareholder approval for 
supplemental executive retirement plans from the proxy, the AFL-CIO organized a rally at the 
company’s annual meeting with union members bearing “Give it back Hank” placards, in an 
attempt to embarrass the CEO.229 They even had an aircraft flying above, trailing similar 
messages.230  
 The Connecticut Retirement Funds adopted similar stances against nine other 
companies.231 After news broke that the CEO of UnitedHealth held $1.6 billion in unexercised 
stock options and had received options dated back to when company shares were at their 
quarterly lows, two institutional investors, the Minnesota Board of Investment, and CalPERS, 
stepped up their attack on the board and launched a campaign for withhold votes.232 Despite a 
preemptive strike by the board on the eve of the annual meeting by announcing new 
compensation guidelines, the abrogation of golden parachute payments for senior executives, and 
the slashing of board compensation by 40%, two compensation committee members had to suffer 
the ignominy of seeing 28% withhold votes against their names.233  
                                                                                                                                                             
respected Corporate Library, in its 2003 governance rankings, ranked Verizon as one of the ‘ten worst’ among large 
U.S. companies, reporting that ‘the contracts and compensation policies for both Seidenberg and former co-CEO 
Lee contain virtually every example of excess and lack of control that could be found at a U.S. corporation, as well 




 Brooke A. Masters, A Campaign To Tighten Executive Pay, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2006, at D1, available at 
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 INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, 2006 POSTSEASON REPORT: SPOTLIGHT ON EXECUTIVE PAY AND BOARD 
ACCOUNTABILITY 5 (2007), available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/2006PostSeasonReportFINAL.pdf [hereinafter ISS 




 Id. “This level of investor opposition appears to be greater than what occurred last year at companies that faced 
criticism over pay practices. Among the notable withhold votes in 2005 against pay committee members were 
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 The withhold votes phenomenon was to become widespread during the 2007 proxy 
season. Several companies including Exxon Mobil, Occidental Petroleum, Clear Channel 
Communications (31% withhold votes), Computer Associates (26%), and Home Depot saw their 
directors being targeted.234 Exxon saw over 20% withhold votes for some directors because of 
former CEO Lee Raymond’s $98.4 million retirement package.235 Ryland Group shareholders 
slapped a compensation committee member with a 34% withhold vote because of anger over 
supplemental retirement benefits for the CEO.236 Ill-timed option grants saw two compensation 
committee members at Michaels’ Stores being hit with 25% withhold votes.237 M.D.C. Holdings 
saw shareholders react with a 17% withhold vote after controversial senior executive bonuses.238 
The Utility Workers Union of America put forth a proposal targeting Exelon CEO John Rowe’s 
2006 compensation of $16.4 million.239 
 The United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America submitted proposals 
calling for “pay for superior performance.”240 These were submitted to companies including 
Black & Decker, Weyerhaeuser, DuPont, and averaged 34.7% support at ten firms, an impressive 
achievement for a debut proposal. 241 This group has been active at several companies: at 3M, it 
submitted a proposal on executive compensation to be determined by benchmarking against peer 
companies, contending that the company’s current compensation arrangements do not reflect the 
“pay for superior performance principle.”242 This was rebuffed by the management, claiming 
                                                                                                                                                             





 Id. “This dissent was remarkable, given the oil giant’s recent record earnings and that no director had received less 
than 96 percent support in more than a decade, according to news reports.” Id. 
236
 Id. at 6. 
237




 See Brandon Glenn, Union Wants Exelon to Adopt “Say on Pay” Measure, ChicagoBusiness.com, Apr. 24, 2007, 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?id=26143&seenIt=1; see also UWUA Proposal for 2008 Annual 
Meeting of Exelon Shareholders, http://www.exelonpaywatch.org/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2008). The UWUA 2008 
proxy proposal stated:  
We believe executive compensation at our Company has become clearly excessive. For 
example, in 2006 Exelon awarded nearly $35 million to only five top executives, including total 
compensation of $16.4 million to CEO John Rowe.  
 
This was significantly higher than top executive pay at comparable companies. For 
example, TXU Corp. awarded $6.4 million less to its CEO, despite posting $960 million more in 
net income. Indeed, in 2006 Mr. Rowe was the highest paid out of all chief executive officers in 
the 20 companies comprising the Philadelphia Utilities Index – collecting 73% more than the 
average of CEO pay in the entire index. 
Id. 
240
 Id. at 21. 
241
 Id. at 8. 
242
 See 3M Co., Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 28 (Mar. 26, 2007), available at http://sec.edgar-
online.com/2007/03/26/0001104659-07-022316/Section13.asp [hereinafter 3M Proxy Statement]. 
36 
Draft 
such benchmarking was already being done.243 They also contended that “[s]enior executives are 
effectively motivated when their performance-based compensation is directly tied to 3M’s 
performance and not to the performance of ‘peer companies’ over which 3M’s senior executives 
have no control.”244  
 Resolutions sponsored by AFSCME aimed at giving shareholders an annual advisory vote 
on compensation committee reports received an average of about 40% support at Home Depot, 
US Bancorp, Countrywide Financial, and Merrill Lynch.245 The campaign relied on say on pay 
resolutions working well in the United Kingdom, and their “belie[f] that existing U.S. corporate 
governance arrangements, including SEC rules and stock exchange listing standards, do not 
provide stockholders with enough mechanisms for providing input to boards on senior executive 
compensation.”246 The response of Qwest’s board is remarkably typical:  
[T]his proposal fails to recognize that stockholders already have a more efficient 
and meaningful method of communicating with our directors with respect to 
compensation and other issues, and that, in any case, the compensation program 
that we have established for our executive officers is thoughtful, performance-
based, and in the best interest of our stockholders.247  
                                                                                                                                                             
The annual incentive or bonus component of the Plan should utilize defined financial performance 
criteria benchmarked against a disclosed peer group of companies, and provide that an annual 
bonus should be awarded only when the Company’s performance exceeds its peers’ median or 
mean performance on the selected financial criteria;  
 
. . . The long-term compensation component of the Plan should utilize defined financial and/or 
stock price performance criteria benchmarked against a disclosed peer group of companies. 
Options, restricted shares, or other equity or non-equity compensation used in the Plan should be 
structured so that compensation is received only when the Company’s performance exceeds its 
peers’ median or mean performance on the selected financial and stock price performance criteria . 
. . . 
Id.  
243
 See 3M Co., Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 2 (May 2, 2006), available at 
http://www.secinfo.com/d11MXs.vt6a.htm. 
[W]here it has proven feasible to do so, the Company already makes a significant portion of its 
senior executives’ incentive compensation payable based on 3M’s performance as compared to 
that of other industrial companies. Fully 40% of the value of the 2005 awards under our 3-year 
Performance Unit Plan will be based on the extent to which 3M’s “Sales Growth” performance 
exceeds the Industrial Production Index (“IPI”) as published by the Federal Reserve;  
 
. . . [T]he United Brotherhood proposal is too vague and unworkable to be applied at a diversified 
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 Like every other board that was hit with such a resolution, they claim “that direct 
communication between stockholders and the Board is a much more effective and accurate 
method of expressing support or criticism of our executive compensation practices.”248 The other 
standard response appears to be that “[a] stockholder vote would not be helpful in identifying any 
particular practice or issue that may be of concern to our stockholders.”249 
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) reports that a total of 240 pay-related proposals 
were filed for annual meetings between January and May 2007, an increase from the 131 such 
proposals in the comparable period during the previous year.250 At the end of June 2007, CEO 
compensation proposals that sought to link pay with performance secured an average vote of 
42.4% at twenty-nine annual meetings.251 Eleven shareholder proposals related to executive pay 
have won majority support in 2007.252 Six of these eleven resolutions were with regard to 
shareholder approval of golden parachutes, with Ryland shareholders leading the charge with 
73% of the votes being in favor of the proposal.253 A proposal calling for performance-based 
restricted stock was carried by a 53.4% vote at JPMorgan Chase.254  
The wave of activism is not restricted to left-leaning entities; the Amalgamated Bank 
sponsored a performance-based equity plan at Novellus and won 52% support.255 A similar 
proposal for performance-based options won 50.5% at Pulte Homes.256 At Lucent Technologies, 
there was majority backing for two pay-related proposals, relating to performance-based stock, 
and pension fund surplus.257 Professor Lucian Bebchuk’s proposals mandating disclosure of the 
estimated value of the benefits provided to top executives under any pension, deferred 
compensation plan, or supplemental retirement plan received 44.2% and 48.9% votes at Home 
Depot and El Paso respectively.258 ISS added to its benchmark voting guidelines by 
recommending voting against compensation committee members who were responsible for what 
it called “poor pay practices.”259 Pursuant to this approach, ISS recommended votes against 
directors at several companies, a phenomenon that can be expected to become more prevalent 
unless there is visible change in how directors approve compensation packages.260 
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 Considering the infancy of the say on pay movement, it has been remarkably successful. 
Merck saw 49.2% of the votes being cast in favor of such a resolution.261 At Morgan Stanley, 
37% of the shareholders voted in favor over anger at John Mack, chairman and CEO, being paid 
a compensation package worth $41.4 million last year, including $36.2 million worth of 
restricted stock, and two other senior executives receiving over $30 million.262 The company had 
been at the center of a storm in the preceding years over the golden parachute awarded to the 
former CEO to the tune of $52 million.263 This had prompted shareholders to pass a resolution 
requiring shareholder approval for golden parachutes.264 AFSCME moved a resolution for a 
nonbinding advisory vote on compensation.265 This was supported by ISS,266 but met with 
familiar objections from the board, including that such resolutions send unclear signals.267 It is 
baffling that the lack of clarity argument is frequently trotted out because it can be easily 
addressed. All that is needed is a multi-pronged vote that captures the various elements of the 
compensation package. 
At Bank of New York, the resolution received 47% support (the CEO made $14 million 
the previous year).268 Say on Pay majorities were achieved at Valero Energy and Ingersoll-Rand. 
However, despite repeated claims that the CEO is overpaid, shareholders at Countrywide only 
cast 31.7% of the votes in favor of a say on pay resolution.269 At JC Penney, the Bricklayers 
Union championed a resolution that asked the company to seek shareholder approval prior to 
severance packages that exceeded an executive’s annual salary and bonus by a factor of 2.99.270 
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Angered by a $10.2 million severance package to an executive who had been employed by the 
company for six months, the shareholders passed the resolution.271 
In addition to taking action on a company-by-company basis, norms entrepreneurs have 
been at the forefront of regulatory activity by applying pressure at the early stages of drafting. In 
response to the SEC’s proposed action on increasing disclosure of executive compensation, 
norms entrepreneurs were instrumental, at least in part, for the 23,000 comment letters received 
by the SEC.272 They were also active in Congress during the passage of the Say on Pay Bill in the 
House. 
Some norms entrepreneurs have sought to put forth standards of their own. For example, 
the Taft-Hartley unit has devised a compensation policy predicated on the total size of a CEO’s 
total direct compensation (“TDC”) awarded over the past year, the TDC percentage increase 
from the prior year, the company’s cumulative stock performance over the past one, three, and 
five years, and the company’s stock performance over the same time periods in relation to a peer 
group index.273 It recommended votes against directors at thirty-seven companies for 
compensation policies not reflecting a proper alignment of pay for performance under this 
model.274 This is a brilliant strategy for a norms entrepreneur: in the absence of clarity as to what 
constitutes an appropriate measure of performance, the ambiguity can be cleared up by norms 
entrepreneurs stepping into the informational vacuum and supplying relevant measures. To the 
extent these measures are followed by other market participants, norm creation is possible in 
accordance with the processes discussed. Over time, the norm could be internalized by the 
relevant actors. 
 There is also evidence of norms entrepreneurs creating networks by banding together 
over common causes: the AFSCME, and Walden Asset Management created networks to push 
resolutions for say on pay by bringing together public pension funds, labor funds, asset managers, 
foundations, and members of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility.275 Frequently, the 
objective behind the say on pay resolutions adopted by these norms entrepreneurs is to 
collectively shame the companies and their directors for allegedly excessive executive 
compensation, and networking facilitates the deployment of secondary sanctions.276 
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Non-traditional market participants are also taking on the role of norms entrepreneurs in 
the CEO pay debate. The Benedictine Sisters of the St. Scholastica Monastery, near San Antonio, 
entered the fray by filing a resolution at Coca Cola.277 Sister Susan, the director of corporate 
responsibility was quoted as saying, “CEO compensation has in many cases been excessive . . . . 
[w]e stepped up to file this resolution with Coke so that the board of directors and compensation 
committee will understand the importance of this issue both in terms of social responsibility and 
good business practice.”278  
Given the sheer level of activity by such disparate groups, it is not surprising that the 
work of norms entrepreneurs is being noticed by companies. Rudiments of a cooperation norm 
are already emerging. One author writes that “Pfizer, Schering-Plough, Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
JPMorgan Chase, AIG, Colgate-Palmolive, Prudential Financial, Intel, and Tyco International 
agreed to join a working group with institutional investors to examine how U.S. companies can 
effectively implement a shareholder advisory vote.”279 This is nothing short of incredible and 
might be further evidence of network effects.  
 
3. Reasons for the Success of Norms Entrepreneurs 
Greed is a well recognized aspect of corporate life and some have described it as a 
norm.280 Norms entrepreneurs have successfully adopted social sanction strategies because of 
their realization that the old norm allowing greed is not internalized by a vast segment of the 
population. It is also against the message of most religions, and moral leaders, leading to 
widespread appeal. Given this disconnect between an alleged norm that purportedly allows some 
to be greedy, and the internalized values of the vast majority, it was inevitable that the “greed” 
norm would be challenged. One tactic appears to be the infliction of social sanctions like shame 
in order to assert the norm held by the majority and to displace the “greed” norm. As Moira 
Herbst notes: 
[t]he point… is to make executives like Isdell a bit uncomfortable. Nuns, 
especially elderly ones who have dedicated their lives to humane works, have a moral 
vantage point available to few others. They’ll try to use that position this year at 
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Coke, as well as at Wal-Mart Stores, Delphi, and Caterpillar, on issues including 
global labor standards and the disparity between worker and executive 
compensation.281  
 
The stinted efforts of norms entrepreneurs appears to be having a tipping effect, aided no 
doubt by a bandwagon effect, as more institutional shareholders and small investors follow their 
lead and put forth similar proposals aimed at curtailing compensation. Politicians and other 
change agents facilitate tipping, and the creation of a new norm that correlates pay with 
performance. The result of so many actors campaigning for the establishment of the same norm is 
that it raises the stakes for companies and their boards to comply or face sanctions. 
The work of norms entrepreneurs in creating corporate law norms is not unique to the 
case of CEO compensation or to the U.S.282 Norms entrepreneurs have been active in other areas 
of corporate law. Writing about the need for norm change to achieve change in board diversity, 
one writer gives the example of the Alliance for Board Diversity, comprised of other 
organizations like Catalyst, the Executive Leadership Council, and the Hispanic Association for 
Corporate Responsibility, for the effectiveness of norms entrepreneurs.283 She cites CalPERS as a 
norm entrepreneur working for the greater inclusion of women and minorities on corporate 
boards.284 CalPERS has also had a marked influence on Japanese corporate law and public 
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4. Tipping, Cascading, and Changing Equilibrium 
The febrile activity on CEO compensation is evocative of Malcom Gladwell’s writings 
about epidemics.286 His theory is that these epidemics are transmitted “through social 
connections and energy and enthusiasm and personality.”287 The current climate with regard to 
excessive CEO pay is very much like an epidemic. There is scarcely a day in the press without 
significant newsprint devoted to its coverage. The infectious agents in this context appear to be 
institutional shareholders, labor unions, and some activist shareholders, all profiting from an 
environment that favors the transmission of the epidemic.  
Gladwell writes that the transmission process is served by “mavens” who take delight in 
learning a great deal about emerging norms and share that knowledge freely with others.288 This 
helps to transmit information widely at a low cost.289 He defines “connectors” as entrepreneurs 
merely by virtue of circumstance; they are placed in that position because of relationships and 
contacts with a wide variety of people.290 These connectors spread emerging norms widely 
simply because they “connect” to many different social groups and at many different levels.291 
Both mavens and connectors spread norms.292 This is precisely what is transpiring currently in 
the CEO compensation area. There are “mavens” like Professor Bebchuk, connectors like 
Congressman Barney Frank, and norms entrepreneurs like ISS helping to make information 
accessible, and to create a climate for the arousal of outrage. In addition, the increasing income 
disparities in society create the climate for “infection” to spread and reach the scale of an 
“epidemic,” ultimately implanting new norms. 
The success of norms entrepreneurs is also aided in situations involving actors placing a 
high premium on reputation. Sunstein writes that people’s concern for their reputations makes 
them “do what (they think) other group members think they should do.”293 He points to the ever-
growing desire for conformity in society as suggestive of the ways in which norms tip.294 
According to him, “[t]he result of this process can be to produce snowball or cascade effects, as 
small or even large groups of people end up believing something – even if that something is false 
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– simply because other people seem to believe that it is true.”295 The occurrence of a cascade is 
conditional on the lack of much private information;296 the more confident people are about their 
own judgments, the less susceptible they are to outside influences. There can also be reputational 
cascades caused by people believing that they must engage in certain behaviors in order to 
protect their reputations.297 Sunstein writes that reputational cascades can result if “reputational 
considerations loom large” in the making of a given decision.298 In contrast, “[i]f people do not 
care about their reputations, or if reputation is a small component of the choice involved, the 
perceived intrinsic merits will be crucial, and cascades are unlikely to result.”299  
Directors of boards are from sections of society that value their reputations intensely. 
Given that they are not the principal and direct beneficiaries of CEO greed, their concern for 
reputation makes them favorably disposed to the work of norms entrepreneurs in the 
compensation arena. While the greedy CEO can tradeoff a fat pay check in exchange for lowered 
reputation, directors are not paid enough for them to act similarly. Their compensation is 
primarily in terms of esteem. If this is undercut by the work of norms entrepreneurs, they might 
be incentivized to internalize a new norm. 
The work of norms entrepreneurs in the examples provided above showing resolutions on 
say on pay might also give rise to a signaling equilibrium. The very act of proposing and 
canvassing of votes is costly and provides information about the shareholders of the company. If 
say on pay resolutions are carried, they might result in the creation of separating equilibria that 
allows firms to separate themselves from companies that do not have adequate restraints on 
excessive CEO pay.300 This could have a positive effect on the stock price if the market values 
such checks on CEO pay. The creation of such equilibria might explain the success of norms 
entrepreneurs. 
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To be sure, the catalytic role played by norms entrepreneurs was possible because their 
causes are aligned with the zeitgeist. As one author notes, “social change occurs for a complex 
variety of reasons. It is driven to some degree by the opinions and actions of influential people 
(role models), who precipitate change because they are widely noticed and imitated.”301 
Frequently, there is a bandwagon effect created by the working of norms entrepreneurs whereby 
momentum leads to individuals who do not have strong attitudes about the behavior in question 
being swept up to conform.302 In the context of the corporate norm of greed, the social meaning 
of the behavior can be altered either by the work of norms entrepreneurs or by the government 
such that following the norm carries externalities, and the momentum built up pushes those on 
the fence towards conduct avoiding these externalities.303 This is particularly salient for directors, 
because they are not the direct beneficiaries of greed, but merely facilitate the greed of CEOs. 
It would be folly to be too sanguine about the beneficial roles played by norms 
entrepreneurs. To be sure, some of the work will be undertaken by actors with particular political 
agendas not shared by the majority, for purely self-interested reasons. The possibility of people 
being victimized even if they have done nothing wrong exists.304 Unlike the case with legal 
sanctions, there is no processual check against this sort of political deployment of social 
sanctions that accompany asserted norm violations, and it would be a travesty if different 
directors were to be treated differently based on different interest groups deciding to mobilize 
social sanctions inconsistently. Interest-group capture is a realistic fear in the case of deploying 
shame sanctions against directors and CEOs. Trade unions and employee groups have a 
particular interest in curtailing CEO pay and these groups are getting increasingly more vocal in 
the proxy process. What is excessive pay to a left-wing trade union might not be so for many 
other market participants, and the deployment of shame sanctions based on political ideologies 
can be a threat to their efficacy. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
CEOs and directors are constrained by social norms to act with regard for the interests of 
their shareholders. Social sanctions present a low cost method to enforce these norms. The 
evidence considered in the preceding pages shows that norms entrepreneurs are working to 
establish norms including say on pay, the 2.99 multiple for severance payments, and majority 
voting for director election. These norms flesh out the well entrenched shareholder wealth 
maximization norm in corporate law. Norm creation is facilitated in corporate law because of the 
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existence of groups where membership benefits are dependent on reputation. Unlike CEOs, 
board members are unable to tradeoff reputation for money because they are not paid enough. 
Since most directors seek board seats due to reputational payoffs rather than financial incentives, 
this enmeshment in groups presents advantages for the creation of useful norms for shareholders. 
Evidence indicates that norms can be created only when there is a sense of obligation. This sense 
of obligation results from internalization and socialization. The work of norms entrepreneurs is 
frequently to socialize relevant actors by imposing costs on them in terms of sanctions such as 
shame. If successful, internalization results in Pareto-self improvements with the relevant actors 
becoming “good types” by internalizing the norm. The example of Home Depot indicates the 
effect of internalization, and differences in behavioral modification based on internalization and 
non-internalization. While the new CEO appears to have internalized the norm, other board 
members resist the norm but modify their behavior due to the costs imposed by norms 
entrepreneurs. The examples of Blockbuster and Verizon illustrate the deleterious consequences 
for board members who choose to ignore the actions of norms entrepreneurs and resist the norm. 
Expulsion can result when norms entrepreneurs are successful in achieving tipping effects. Even 
where tipping is not possible, board members are subjected to shame and embarrassment by 
measures such as withholding votes. The power of such sanctions is evidenced by the behavioral 
modification that seems to follow in subsequent years in such companies. In the light of the 
preliminary evidence offered, it is clear that further empirical examination will offer useful 
insights into the role of norms in constraining CEO pay and correlating it to performance. 
Legislative attempts ought to be restricted to facilitating the application of social sanctions by 
creating conditions, primarily in terms of mandating the disclosure of relevant information in a 
comprehensible format. The law can also assist norms entrepreneurs by deploying its expressive 
power to reveal the popular consensus that CEO greed is unacceptable.  
